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Abstract
This paper presents a case study of a World Bank community-driven development
(CDD) project implemented on agrarian reform settlements in Northeastern Brazil in
partnership with the Landless Workers’ Movement (MST). Critiques of communitydriven development often focus on whether it is truly participatory and on common
causes of project failure, such as elite capture, clientelism, and free riding. The paper uses a mixed methods approach, combining case studies of eight community-driven
development subprojects, interviews with project beneficiaries, technicians, academics,
and social movement leaders, and a census survey of six of the subproject-receiving
communities. The paper finds that, although success in these subprojects was limited,
agrarian settlement institutions and partnership with the Landless Workers’ Movement were essential for avoiding these common causes of project failure, making the
project both more participatory and more effective. My findings imply a key element
of community-driven development project success lies in building institutions that provide an avenue for addressing project problems and which limit the ability of elites to
intervene.
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Introduction

The enthusiasm with participatory development approaches grew over the 1990s and 2000s,
and in response so did criticism. Development institutions, such as the World Bank (WB),
adopted participatory development as a method that could fit their needs, as having the
characteristics of being both decentralized and, following the backlash to the neoliberal
policies of the 1980s and 1990s, morally palatable to the public. Partly, this came about due
to the World Bank’s distrust of the State and fatigue with neoliberal policies (Arcand and
Wagner, 2016). For example in 1998, James Wolfensohn said regarding participation, “We
must never stop reminding ourselves that it is up to the government and its people to decide
what their priorities should be. We must never stop reminding ourselves that we cannot
and should not impose development by fiat from above - or from abroad” (Wolfensohn,
1998).
Participatory development can be defined as the active involvement of participants in
the development process. More specifically, participatory development stresses bottom-up
rather than top-down approaches, prioritizes the goal of empowerment, and gives priority to local or indigenous knowledge (Henkel and Stirrat, 2001). Participatory approaches
have been adopted by a variety of institutions in addition to the World Bank, such as by
national governments, by international non-governmental organizations, and by other international development institutions (Brett, 2003). The World Bank’s current approach to
participatory development is called community-driven development (CDD); it posits that
community control of development projects and funds creates efficient outcomes and empowered communities, while reducing corruption (Coirolo and Lammert, 2009; Chambers,
1983; Craig and Mayo, 1995; World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, 2005).
While the model of CDD may be attractive, its application has encountered serious
obstacles (Cooke, 2001). The success of community-driven development depends on the
ability of participants to organize around a specific goal, to access and receive subproject
funds, to decide on a particular subproject, and to work and maintain the subproject
collaboratively. Thus, criticisms of CDD tend to center on some typical causes of failure:
clientelism (when politicians exchange subprojects for votes), elite capture of funds (when
an elite within a community controlled the subproject funds), and free-riding by members
in the community.
My study explores how the goal of community involvement, input, and control over a
local-level development process played out in the specific institutional context of a World
Bank CDD project, called São José Agrário (SJA). It provided grants for small-scale infrastructure and productive subprojects in agrarian settlements in North-Eastern Brazil.1 São
José Agrário was a somewhat unique experiment in CDD. It combined what many critics of
community-driven development deem a top-down approach to participatory development
with what most critics would agree to be a bottom-up approach. In fact, it accomplished
one of the stated goals of CDD: a real partnership with a civil society group in the CDD
process. This occurred because a social movement (the Landless Workers’ Movement, MST)
organized and demanded access to State/World Bank development funds (called São José
II)and partnership in administrating the subprojects. Additionally, the project was implemented in agrarian reform settlements which had previously organized around gaining
1
Project refers to state-level projects. Subprojects refers to community-level projects. Examples of
subprojects included irrigation, mechanization, bee-keeping, reservoirs, and fences.
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access to land. These settlements already had established institutions for a common project
— that of creating a settlement.
Critics of the CDD approach begin at the fundamental level of questioning if the approach is truly a participatory bottom-up approach. Some criticize development programs’
use of a participatory approach for co-opting the meaning of participatory development. For
example, Parfitt writes that participation has been reduced to “a managerial exercise based
on ‘toolboxes’ of procedures and techniques; it has ignored critical engagement and class,
and while playing lip-service to empowerment mainly devotes itself to efficiency” (Parfitt,
2004, 22). These criticisms highlight a theoretical divide identifying two categories from the
perspective of bottom-up versus top-down approaches to participatory development based
on the goals of the actors advocating for participatory development. I call these the radical
approach and the project-based approach.2
The radical approach to participatory development highlights the use of participation to
confront power, knowledge, and income inequalities. This approach emphasizes explicitly
political collective action to increase the power of the participants. The radical approach
envisions a process in which those with less power actively confront those with more power
to shift the balance of power. In this way, the less powerful can gain the power necessary
to change the conditions of their existence (Rahman, 1995; Freire, 1970).
The project-based approach to participatory development posits that community control
of development projects and funds will make these projects more effective by creating
efficient outcomes, empowering communities, and reducing corruption (Mansuri and Rao,
2012). The project-based approach relies not only on the peoples’ participation but also the
importance of incorporating peoples’ knowledge or indigenous knowledge (Rapley, 2007).
Efficient outcomes are expected to stem from two sources. First, the community’s practical
knowledge of what they need and the local conditions will result in the direction of funds
toward the community’s highest priority in each case (Chambers, 1983; Banerjee and Duflo,
2011). In addition, local knowledge is expected to facilitate the targeting of the project to
the poorest in the most cost-effective way, not only because these projects are efficient, but
also because the participants bear a portion of the cost of the project in terms of both labor
and monetary contributions (Paul, 1987; Mayo and Craig, 1995). Second, this approach
assumes empowerment will result by putting the community in charge of defining their
needs and priorities and acting upon them through received funds, increasing members’
capabilities, political voice, and control over the development project. Lastly, corruption is
expected to be reduced as the subproject funds are directed through local-level governments
with greater civil society participation (Mansuri and Rao, 2012).
My particular division of radical versus project-based approaches to participatory development is not unique. Several other authors have followed a similar line of logic. For
example, Tufte and Mefalopulos divide approaches into the social movement perspective
and the project-based or institutional perspective (Tufte and Mefalopulos, 2009). Mansuri
and Rao divide participatory development between organic participation and induced participation (Mansuri and Rao, 2012). Oakley defines participation based on whether it is a
means or an ends (Oakley, 1991).
All of these divisions share commonalities. The social movement perspective, organic
participation, and end process are all focused on changing power relations. For example
2

I borrowed the name project-based for the lack of a better term from Tufte and Mefalopulos (Tufte and
Mefalopulos, 2009).
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Tufte and Metafalopulos describing the social movement perspective write, “Some stakeholders define participation as the mobilization of people to eliminate unjust hierarchies of
knowledge, power, and economic distribution” (Tufte and Mefalopulos, 2009, 4). Mansuri
and Rao explain that organic participation covers social movements and other forms of civic
action and is intrinsically motivated. Oakley writes that participation as an end is a process
and has the goal of fomenting and reinforcing the capabilities of rural peoples, and may
not be measurable (Oakley, 1991). Participation as an ends is expected to change power
relations between the community and the development agency, in which the community
gains greater power increasing equality between the two and is thereby empowered (Parfitt,
2004).
On the other hand, the project-based (or institutional) perspective, induced participation, or means process are all focused on using participation to achieve a development
policy goal generally promoted by an outside group or institution, and as such are less
likely to challenge power hierarchies (Parfitt, 2004). Tufte and Metafolopulos define the
project-based or institutional perspective as “...the reach and inclusion of inputs by relevant
groups in the design and implementation of a development project” (Tufte and Mefalopulos, 2009, 4). Mansuri and Rao define induced participation as participation which requires
the intervention of “powerful” institutions that provide extrinsic motivation. In the case of
organic participation, participants are assumed to be intrinsically motivated (Mansuri and
Rao, 2012). Such participation is “promoted through policy actions of the state and implemented by bureaucracies (the “state” can include external governments working through
bilateral and multilateral agencies, which usually operate with the consent of the sovereign
state)” (Mansuri and Rao, 2012, 32). Oakley explains that participation as a means is
based on reaching a predetermined objective, reaching the said objective is more important
than the participation itself (Oakley, 1991). Parfitt writes, “... participation as a means is
politically neutral insofar as it does not address such power differentials...” (Parfitt, 2004,
539). Project-based approaches, while not addressing power, do often have the goal of empowerment by way of increasing social capital and capabilities. Research by McCaARTHY
et al. analyzed the effectiveness of the CDD approach at reaching these goals and found it
to be inconclusive McCARTHY et al. (2017).
This article analyzes a sample of those SJA subprojects to contribute to understanding
what institutions can assist in overcoming common problems faced by CDD projects cited
in the literature — those of clientelism, elite capture, and free riding. This is contextualized
within the theoretical question of what constitutes participatory development by analyzing
a unique case study that has elements of both a project-based and a radical participatory
development project. I argue the partnership between the MST and the State is a hybrid
of the radical and project-based approaches, and that this partnership, as well as the
implementation of the subprojects in communities with institutions of collective action,
provided the communities with the tools to overcome clientelism, elite capture, and free
riding.
The article is organized as follows; section 2 provides the case study background, section 3 describes the methodology, section 4, 5, and 6 address how the settlers dealt with
clientelism, elite capture, and free riding respectively, and section 7 concludes.
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2

Background

The community-driven development approach was first implemented in the Brazilian state
of Ceará during the 1980s (Coirolo and Lammert, 2009). Deemed a success, the World
Bank reformulated their projects in Ceará around this approach in 1993. In 2001, the
Rural Poverty Reduction Project was implemented by the World Bank, locally named São
José II (SJII) by the State of Ceará.3 SJII was funded via a WB loan of US$70 million and
State counterpart funding of US$38.6 million and continued until 2009 (The World Bank,
2009). In Ceará, the implementing agency is the Department for Agrarian Development
(SDA - Secretaria de Desenvolvimento Agrário).
In 2007, soon after the additional financing loan for SJII was approved, the MST (Landless Workers Movement) occupied the SDA. This was an example of what Funder writes
of as “the particular role of local community members in co-shaping and/or subverting
the practices and power relations of participation as they develop on the ground” (Funder,
2010, 1710). The MST demanded and gained around US$15 million in project funds for
agrarian reform settlements.4 The SDA called this subcomponent of the SJII project São
José Agrário (SJA). São José Agrário was originally set to fund 180 subprojects on agrarian settlements; in the end, they were able to disburse funds to 163 settlements (Sao Jose
Agrario Technician B, 2013).
Although São José Agrário followed roughly the same guidelines as the larger SJII
project, important differences resulted from collaboration with the MST. The MST played
an active role accompanying the projects from start to finish and dialoguing with the
SDA. First and foremost the MST chose which settlements would receive projects based on
their participation in the occupation of the SDA to gain SJII funds and the settlements’
desire to carry out a project. The state did not intervene in the MST’s selection process
unless associations or subprojects did not meet eligibility criteria. The MST and the state
technicians also assisted settlements in project choice.
In comparison, the SJII project began by attempting to disseminate the project to the
public. Individuals or groups who wanted to apply for funds formed legally recognized
community associations with a bank account specific to the project. The community association would then prepare a subproject proposal and submit it to the state technical unit
housed in the Department of Agrarian Development (SDA). Groups choose projects from
a menu given by the WB and the State agency.
The SJA process was further simplified by the fact that the settlements already had
legally recognized community associations, as an association is a requirement of settlement
creation. In both the SJA and SJII projects, once the community’s selected project was
approved, the communities acted collectively to implement, operate, and maintain the
3

The World Bank and the state of Ceará had different names for the same projects. The State of Ceará
used São José to refer to many of the projects co-funded by the WB and the State of Ceará. Each new
project was given a number, thus São José I, São José II, São José III.
4
At the national level expropriation-based land reform emerged out of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution
administered by the National Institute of Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA, Instituto Nacional
de Colonização e Reforma Agrária). In the late 1990s, the WB implemented a market-based land reform
program (Pereira, 2004). Although the Landless Workers Movement is most closely linked to expropriationbased land reform, in this case they were working with both types of land reform settlements. Five of my
study settlements were national appropriation-based land reform settlements and three were market-based
land reform settlements.
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project. The association had to provide at least 10% of the project’s cost in labor, cash, or
kind.

3

Methodology

My study is based on 14 months of fieldwork: July and August of 2011, and July 2012
through June 2013. I used a mixed methods approach combining in-depth interviews,
a survey, and participant observation. I conducted interviews with over 60 government
officials, project technicians, academics, social movement leaders, labor union leaders, and
CDD participants. In addition, I conducted 8 case studies of agrarian settlements which
have received the SJA subprojects (of 163 total subprojects).
I chose two municipalities, Canindé and Quixeramobim, that had a large number of
subprojects with a similar micro-climate — the sertão, a semi-arid region in northeastern
Brazil. I then choose only settlements that had been established between 1998 and 2002.
This allowed me to evaluate settlements that were constructed under similar agrarian reform
programs, both market-based and national land reform settlements. All settlements had
been functioning for at least 10 years, giving them time to experiment with and establish
institutions. Lastly, I excluded all settlements with greater than 30 families or less than 10
families. This ensured I compared settlements of similar size and allowed me to administer
a census survey.
Once I sorted the subprojects in my two chosen municipalities for these criteria I was
left with seven settlements. I included one additional settlement (Settlement 1) in the
municipality of Itapipoca, which had a strong affiliation with the MST. In Settlement 1
and 2, I conducted interviews with 14 and 12 households respectively (around half the
households in each settlement). Interviewees were purposively sampled for variation in
age, gender, and leadership roles within each settlement. Using this information I created
a survey instrument that I applied to all households in the remaining six settlements; a
total of 93 households. The census survey allowed me to obtain household level descriptive
statistics for the settlements surveyed. My study design maintains the confidentiality of all
interviewees and survey participants.
The productive SJA subprojects in my study included beekeeping, irrigation for fruit
trees and vegetable crops, growing capim (a grass feed for livestock), and a cashew plantation. Infrastructure subprojects mainly dealt with water storage and perimeter fences.5

4

Clientelism

Community-driven Development projects emphasize a devolution of power from central
government to the local government (in my case studies this was from the central to the state
government). Optimally, decentralization creates local spaces that are more responsive to
local constituencies’ demands. Yet, it can also foment local-level clientelism. Characteristics
5

The WB and the SDA classify a particular project as infrastructure or productive. Infrastructure
indicates that the subproject is built to create or reinforce the settlement’s infrastructure, indirectly contributing to increasing the productive potential of the settlement and/or directly increasing the well-being of
the settlers (Coirolo and Lammert, 2009). Productive subprojects are designed to increase the settlement’s
production aimed for sale in the market-place (Coirolo and Lammert, 2009). I use their classification.
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of clientelism include inequality between the patron and client (which allows for threats of
coercion), reciprocal exchange, and a personal relationship (Mainwaring, 1999). Brazil has
a history of deeply entwined practices of clientelism (Mainwaring, 1999; Finan, 2004). As
such CDD projects in Brazil are particularly susceptible to clientelism. Clientelism becomes
problematic when the exchange of subprojects for votes results in the non-targeted receiving
subprojects, which can contribute to both greater inequality and greater inefficiency as
resources are used for the short-term goal of (re)election (Mansuri and Rao, 2012; Camacho
and Conover, 2011).
Interviews at the state level with representatives of the SDA, MST, and the state level
agricultural workers’ union (Federação dos Trabalhadores Rurais Agricultores e Agricultoras
Familares do Estado do Ceará, FETRAECE) revealed that the greater SJII project had
encountered considerable difficulties with clientelism, but that it was a lesser problem in the
SJA project. In the larger SJII subprojects, according to one interview, clientelism occurred
in the following way. Since many of the communities had difficulty writing the subproject
pre-proposal and also frequently lacked access to a computer necessary to prepare the
subproject proposal, politicians would offer to help communities develop the subprojects in
exchange for votes (FETRAECE Representative B, 2013).
In the SJA project, clientelism was mitigated by the accompaniment of the MST and
by the settlers themselves. The Landless Workers’ Movement is conscious of the problem of
clientelism and spends significant energy opposing it (Starr et al., 2011). In some cases upon
the release of the SJA subprojects, politicians would show up and attempt to take credit
for the subprojects. The settlers, with the backing of the Landless Workers’ Movement,
refused to accept that the politicians deserved credit (and votes) for these subprojects. One
MST representative described it this way.
In order for you to note the magnitude of the norm [clientelism], how deepseated it is, many politicians and municipal administrations went to the radios
to say that the [sub]projects that had arrived in the municipalities, the São José
[Sub]Projects, had been an achievement of the politicians, of their policies. But
the people respond[ed]. We had rallies in the inauguration of the [sub]projects
to raise awareness that they had been the workers’ achievement. [We raised
awareness] that the struggle [for the subprojects] was worth it, that we struggled
and that you could see the result. On those occasions, the workers would say:
“Look, this work here, this project here is the result of the organization of
the worker. The only power here is the power of the struggle. Nobody did
this for us” (Landless Workers Movement Representative A, 2013, Author’s
Translation).
The participants in the SJA project challenged the politicians from a position of asymmetric power, to prevent the co-option of the projects into an exchange for votes. As such,
it is clear that while clientelism is an embedded norm of the region, the SJA subproject
participants in my study with the assistance of the Landless Workers’ Movement overcame
this problem.
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Elite Capture

Elite capture has also been well documented in the CDD literature. In fact CDD programs
implemented in heterogenous communities are often faulted with aggravating elite capture
(Arcand and Wagner, 2016; Platteau and Abraham, 2010). Mansuri and Rao who have
conducted exhaustive literature reviews into the realm of CDD write, “The studies that
have looked at who participates in CDD projects have found that on average participants
are wealthier, better educated, more politically connected, and from higher status ethnic
and tribal groups” (2012, 128).6 .
Studies that found significant evidence of elite capture also attempted to analyze under
what circumstances it occurs (Fritzen, 2007; Platteau, 2004; Platteau and Gaspart, 2003).
There is a body of evidence suggesting a community’s ability to minimize elite capture and
thereby to maximize the effectiveness of collective action is facilitated by group homogeneity,
either ethnic, social, or economic (Okten and Osili, 2004; Alesina et al., 1999; Araujo
et al., 2008). The settlements in my sample had extensive experience with collective action,
significant ‘social capital’, and democratic management, all of which the research has found
to prevent and limit elite capture (Das Gupta et al., 2004; Chebil and Haque, 2003; Fritzen,
2007; Manssouri and Sparacino, 2009).
The elite can be defined along many parameters, such as income, education, power,
gender, religion, and caste, among others (Dasgupta and Beard, 2007; Mohan and Stokke,
2000; Platteau et al., 2014; Rigon, 2014). In the context of project targeting, an elite
is generally defined against the targeted. The São José Agrário project was under the
umbrella of SJII, which defined its target as low-income, rural people engaged in agricultural
production (The World Bank, 2009, 2). SJA further restricted targeting to only agrarian
settlements. In the next sections, I will explore possible sources of elite power in my case
studies stemming from income, education, background, and access to leadership positions.

5.1

Income

I gathered income data for each family, including crops and animals sold over the year 2012,
transfer payments including Bolsa Familia,7 retirement payments for agricultural workers,
and crop insurance — as well as any wage or salary labor on or off the settlement, and
donations from other family members not living in the settlement. I then calculated the
yearly income for the households. I compare this yearly household income with the household income data collected by the Brazilian government’s 2011 household survey (PNAD,
Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicı́lios) (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estastistica, 2011). The Brazilian government divides income groups into five classes based on
household (assuming a family size of four) average monthly income (which I converted to
yearly income for ease of comparison): Class A (equal to or above R$116,940), Class B (from
R$89,700 to R$116,940), Class C (from R$20,808 to R$89,700), Class D (from R$13,020 to
6

Elite capture does not always have to have a negative effects on the community Platteau and Gaspart
(2003); Das Gupta et al. (2004); Fritzen (2007). For example, in a case study of the Jamaican Social Fund
it was found that, although there was evidence of elite capture by educated connected groups for projects
that had not been ranked as a priority by the majority of the community, after the fact 80 percent of the
people were satisfi
ed with the project and wouldn’t change the project (Rao and Ibanez, 2005, 33)
7
A national conditional cash transfer program.
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R$20,808), and Class E (from R$0 to R$13,020) (Centro de Politicas Sociais, 2011). Class
C covers a large range of almost 70,000 reais per year.8
Although the World Bank’s Implementation Completion and Results Report of the
SJII project does not explicitly list the incomes of those targeted, it does describe them
throughout the report as the poor and very poor (The World Bank, 2009). Two studies
of the SJII project, one financed by the WB and one independently financed found that
on average the SJII project beneficiary households fall into the Class C designation (The
World Bank, 2009, 57, 64).
In Table 1, I classify all the households from my survey implemented in six settlements
into each of the classes. I then compare the settlements by class. No settlement households
fell into the Classes A or B. The class with the most households from my survey was Class
E (also the poorest class) with 55 households (59%). There was also a sizable portion
that fell into Class D, 21 households (23%) and Class C, 17 households (18%). Table 1
indicates moderate income inequality in the settlements. The breakdown shows that eightytwo percent of the beneficiaries fell into Class D and Class E and may be considered poor
or very poor. For the most part, the SJA subprojects in my case studies did reach those
targeted by the greater SJII project as poor and very poor.9
I compare this distribution with that of rural Ceará. I also use the Brazilian government’s household survey, the PNAD survey, to get a measure of the income classes in rural
Ceará, which includes a total of 3,532 households. Interestingly, Table 1 shows that if I
take all households in my survey and classify them into the Brazilian government’s income
classes, the percentage in each income class of C, D, and E, reflects that of the rural Ceará.
Table 1: Income by Class
Class
Settlement 3
Settlement 4
Settlement 5
Settlement 6
Settlement 7
Settlement 8
All Settlements
Rural Ceará

A
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7

B
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3

Number
C
D
1
1
1
5
0
4
2
1
7
6
6
4
17
21
607 853

E
10
4
15
7
12
7
55
2062

A
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
.2

B
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
.08

Percent
C
D
8.3 8.3
10
50
0
21
20
10
28
24
35
24
18
23
17
24

E
83 .3
40
79
70
48
41
59
58

Author’s Data and PNAD 2011 (Brazilian government’s Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de
Domicı́lios).

I also calculated the Gini for the households by settlement and find that the settlement
Ginis fall between .32 and .57.10 These Ginis are useful in understanding the level of
income inequality in these settlements. Overall the Ginis as compared with country-level
Ginis would indicate a moderate to high level of income-inequality. Yet, if we refer to Table
1 above, we see that all household incomes fall into classes C, D and E. Those that did fall
Over the period of 2011-2013 the average exchange rate was around R$2:USD1. As such the income
classes (based on annual income) would be Class A (equal to or above USD 58,470), Class B (from USD
44,850 to USD 58,470), Class C (from USD 10,404 to USD 44,850), Class D (from USD 6,510 to USD
10,404), and Class E (from USD 0 to USD 6,510).
9
See online data appendix for a breakdown of assets.
10
See the online data appendix for per capita Ginis.
8
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into the rather large range of class C, did so at the lower end. Thus, the income inequality in
the settlements reflects levels of poverty, ranging from very poor to moderately poor/lower
middle income.
Table 2: Household Income Inequality by Settlement
Settlement
All
3
4
5
6
7
8

Min
918
918
3523
2416
2794
1690
5540

Max
48232
29468
30951
18850
22927
29930
48232

Median
10776
2994
1398
7973
9018
15586
15667

Gini
.42
.57
.32
.34
.34
.36
.33

Author’s Data. Reais per year per household. Over 2013, the exchange rate was roughly two Reais to one US Dollar.

My data paints a picture of the settlements as a place of moderate income inequality.11
I decomposed the overall Gini for my data and found that a main component of the income
inequality was due to receiving monthly pension payments (set at the minimum monthly
salary for the region) from the government, which can be significantly greater than what
the average settler makes via agricultural production.12 This indicates that rather than a
social or class-based hierarchy creating differences, it is demographic differentiation related
to age.

5.2

Education

Education can also engender elite power, and as such, provide an avenue for elite capture.
In the case study settlements, education differed by generation. In general, schooling was
inversely correlated with age after excluding those under eighteen. Historically, in rural areas due to lack of transportation and a lack of rural schools, access to schooling was limited.
Policies focused on education implemented post-1995 increased access to and attendance in
schools.
I argue age, once we exclude those under eighteen, is a main determinant of education.
If this is true then even though there are differences in education, often these differences
will be found within households.13 It would make little sense for the younger generations to
exclude the older generations from project benefits (as the older generations may be their
family members).
Below I run an OLS regression to check that age is indeed an explanatory variable
controlling for gender and settlement in which the individual resides. My survey included
questions on education, age, and gender for all household members, resulting in a total of
420 observations (in 93 households). Once I drop all people under the age of 18, I am left
with 259 observations. I drop those younger than eighteen because in this group age will
be structurally correlated with education. I test the hypothesis that older age will predict
less education.
11

I also found moderate asset inequality. See the online data appendix for more details.
See online data appendix for the decomposition.
13
A breakdown of my data by age and education occurs in the online data appendix.
12
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Table 3: OLS Regression Results Dependent Variable Education
Variables

Education (1)

Age

-0.154***
(0.011)
0.938***
(0.351)
0.806
(0.677)
0.506
(0.592)
1.670**
(0.714)
-0.399
(0.567)
2.083***
(0.587)
10.03***
(0.579)

Female
Settlement 4
Settlement 5
Settlement 6
Settlement 7
Settlement 8
Constant

Observations
R-squared

259
0.526

The model is an OLS regression estimating the effect of age
on educational achievements of adults (age>17)with dummy
variables for gender and settlement on which the person lives.
Standard errors in parentheses, *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.

I find that age is significant at the one percent level confirming my hypothesis that adult
age and number of years of education are correlated (see Table 3). One additional year of
age is correlated with 0.15 years less of education holding gender and the settlement fixed.
This is a particularly strong result as some young adults may still be in school increasing
their education, which would weaken this relation. In addition, I find that being female
results in an additional 0.938 year of education. For older generations going to school and
working in the fields were competing activities, in which boys spent more time working in
the fields, and girls may have found it feasible to attend school for longer.14

5.3

Background and Leadership Positions

Elite power can also originate from one’s background or the ability to occupy leadership
positions. In my case studies, most people came from similar backgrounds and almost
all were involved in agriculture prior to the settlement. This is to be expected as an
agricultural background is a requirement to join the settlement. Only one of the settlers
previously worked as a small rural producer who owned his own land. Five worked with
their families on their families’ land. All others were permanent or temporary agricultural
workers, or were sharecroppers. In addition, the majority (79 of 93 who completed the
14

Being a member of Settlement 6 and Settlement 8 had a statistically significant impact on educational
outcomes. Settlement 6 had a number of middle-aged and young adults who had become teachers. Settlement 8 had a strong affiliation with the local municipal agricultural workers union which supported
post-secondary education for the Settlement 8 youth.
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survey) came from the same municipality as the settlement location.15
The small size of the settlements, from 10 to 30 registered members, necessitates that
almost everyone occupy a leadership position. In fact, 35% of the 93 households at the
time of the survey held leadership positions. Positions are rotated every two to four years.
In many settlements, the president cannot hold the position for more than two terms
consecutively. As such, the ability for an elite to occupy and hold leadership positions is
difficult. While those with more literacy, often the younger members, are more comfortable
as president, vice president, and secretary, many people who are less educated or illiterate
have also been successful at carrying out these jobs. In addition, the treasurer was often
a position occupied by someone with little traditional literacy, but with numerical literacy.
My data showed no evidence that background or leadership positions were sources of elite
power in the settlements.

5.4

Discussion

The SJA subprojects in my sample successfully reached their targets of the low-income,
rural, workers engaged in agricultural production located on settlements. While on average
the SJA subprojects met the income targets of the greater SJII project (median income
for all settlements falls into Class D or E), there was moderate income inequality in the
settlements, creating the potential for those with relatively more income to manipulate
the subprojects. Thus, the question remains whether this potential was realized. In order
to answer this question, I evaluated whether the households had wanted and voted for
the chosen subproject, if the households had participated in the subproject, reasons for
non-participation, and overall satisfaction with the subprojects.
Ninety percent (63/70) of the households surveyed in my six case studies that were currently living on the settlement when the SJA subprojects were chosen had wanted and voted
for the chosen subproject. Of the seven households that wanted a different SJA subproject,
six of them occurred in Settlement 5 which received an apiculture subproject. Settlement
5 had initially decided on a pisciculture (fish farming) subproject, but at the behest of a
technician who heavily favored apiculture (bee-keeping) subprojects and worried about the
lack of water, the majority voted for an apiculture subproject. When the subproject was
confirmed as an apiculture subproject, eight of nineteen households left the subproject. 16
Additionally, Settlement 5 had very little income inequality; all households fell into the
income classes D and E (4 and 15 households respectively), and the household income Gini
was 0.34, at the low end for the settlements.
Almost all eligible households began by participating in the subprojects. Seventy-one
percent (66/93) of the households were participating in the SJA subproject during my
fieldwork or had been participating when the subproject ended.17 Settlement 7 stands out
as having had less than half (11/25) of the households participating in its subproject when
it ended. This settlement did face moderate income inequality. But the high level of nonparticipation was in part a result of a high turnover of households in this settlement. In
15

See online data appendix for a breakdown.
The technician may have greater education, income, and power than the community but it is helpful to
separate out his influence from that of the influence of a community elite. This particular case is explored
in more detail in Carrick-Hagenbarth (Carrick-Hagenbarth, 2016).
17
See appendix for a breakdown.
16
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fact, fourteen households had joined the settlement after the subproject was put in place.
This and the fact that the subproject was both short-lived and subject to many problems
meant new households were not quick to join the subproject.
There were two main reasons the majority of the twenty-seven non-participating households gave for either their non-participation or attrition from the subproject. First, some
households had joined the settlement after the subproject had been put in place. Depending
on the settlement subproject rules, those arriving after the subproject had been constructed
were either allowed or not allowed to join the subproject. When they were allowed to join,
sometimes families decided they did not wish to join the subproject. Second, some households prioritized their individual production in crops and livestock over that of participation
in the subproject. Table 4 details the reasons given.
Table 4: Reasons for Non-Participation in SJA Subprojects
Reasons for Non-Participation
Entered the settlement after the project was put in place and did not want to join
Did not want to participate in the project due to time constraints
Did not want to participate in project because of collective nature
Did not want to participate in project because of distance
Did not want to participate in project because of fear of project
Not allowed to by rules of the project
Wanted a different project
Other
Total

Frequency
9
7
3
1
1
2
1
3
27

Author’s Data.

When questioned as to whether the households felt the subproject was good for the
community, sixty-one (84%) of the seventy-three settlers who answered the question said
it had been good for the community, and twenty (27%) said they did not know. When
asked to comment on their answer, many said that it was useful to the communities to gain
access to such subprojects and that the subprojects had begun well. The many criticisms of
the subprojects did not cite evidence of elite capture and mostly pointed toward technical
failures.18 Of the twelve that did not feel the subproject was good for the community; half
came from Settlement 6. Settlement 6’s subproject was never implemented.
I do not find evidence to support the elite capture of the subprojects. The targeted
communities received the SJA subprojects. Most settlement members voted for and participated in the subprojects. Subproject outcomes also did not appear to be disproportionately
benefiting one group over another.

6

Free Riding

While there is an abundance of literature addressing free riding in the context of common
pool resources, there has been little analysis of free riding in CDD projects. This may
be because, in the past, many CDD projects have been dedicated to infrastructure. Once
built, infrastructure subprojects require minimal labor or monetary input from participants.
Currently, however, CDD projects are moving toward new livelihood activities (productive
18

I explore this further in Carrick-Hagenbarth (Carrick-Hagenbarth, 2016).
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subprojects), which require long-term ongoing labor and as such present a greater potential
challenge of free riding.
Free riding can be theorized in terms of consumption or production activities (Olson
and Cook, 2006). In the context of public goods and common pool resources, the free
rider problem can be thought of as a consumption activity, in which the challenge is in
either providing an optimal amount of the public good for public consumption when the
incentive is to minimize one’s contribution and to understate one’s ‘true’ preference for
the quantity and quality (McMillan, 1979) or preventing the over-consumption of common
pool resources (Hardin, 1968). Employees and managers in capitalist firms and collective
workers in cooperatives face a free rider problem based in productive activity. Here people
may shirk by under-providing effort in the firm or cooperative. This occurs because of the
difficulty of monitoring effort due to the challenge of measuring the marginal contribution
of each individual (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972).
Most of the settlements I studied established collective work when the settlement was
created. This collective work was aimed at settlement maintenance. Since I choose settlements established between 1998 and 2002, all settlements had over ten years of experience
addressing this obstacle in their settlement collective work. Generally, settlers had successfully handled the free rider problem largely due to settlement institutions.

6.1

The Institutions of Collective Settlement Work

Elinor Ostrom lists in her seminal book Governing the Commons important design principles for the successful collective management of common pool resources. First, it must
be clear who has access to the resource and who has a right to use the resource. Second,
the rules regarding the appropriation of the resource, and the rules outlining who and how
much is provided by the members when there is a need, must reflect local conditions and
means. Third, the majority of the people participating in the use of the resource can affect
the rules. Fourth, the community must have active monitors who are accountable to the
community that uses the resource. Fifth, there should be graduated sanctions so the gravity
of the offense can be taken into account. Sixth, there must be conflict-resolution mechanisms that are both accessible, rapid, and low-cost. Seventh, the external government must
recognize the rights of the community to create and implement rules, as well as to monitor
and sanction members, and must not challenge the community’s rules. Eighth, all design
principles must exist as ‘nested enterprises’ in that these rules are nested within the local,
regional and national governments to some extent, as well as within the community itself
(Ostrom, 1990, p.90).
The settlement collective work institutions begin with the general assembly (see Figure
1). The general assembly is a meeting of all settlement members held once a month and
additionally when needed. This is the arena in which all settlers can participate in creating
the rules for the collective work (and for the settlement in general) and deciding on the
sanctions for members who free ride. This reflects Ostrom’s principle two and three. All
settlers serve as monitors and can easily identify people who do not participate in the group
time set aside for settlement maintenance work. When members do not participate, the
settlement leadership charges them the previously agreed upon fine as a sanction. If a
member continues to fail to participate in the collective work they can be evicted from the
settlement. These sanctions are graduated, Ostrom’s principle number five.
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There are three steps to resolving problems when fines do not prevent non-participation
and the threat of eviction also fails to motivate members to participate (outlined in Figure
1). In the first step, the leadership can meet both individually or in a group with the offending members to reinforce the need for their participation (this occurred in Settlements
4, 5, 6, 7, and 8). Occasionally, these meetings uncover logistical problems that are preventing the settlers from participating (this occurred in Settlements 4 and 5). The settlers
can then move to step 2. In step 2, the leadership brings the obstacles that the individuals
are facing to the general assembly to problem-solve (this occurred in Settlements 4 and 5).
The group may then reorganize the settlement work and modify the rules and sanctions.
This corresponds closely to Ostrom’s principle number six.
If this still fails to resolve the free riding problem, the settlers can move to step 3. In
step 3 the settlers can appeal to the outside entities of the MST, the agricultural workers’
union, INCRA19 , or IDACE20 , to reinforce the sanctions and the need for collective work
(this occurred in Settlement 5). Collective work on the settlements and in the SJA subprojects can be difficult to sustain and accompaniment by groups, such as the MST and the
Agricultural Workers Union, have served an important role in maintaining effectiveness.
In particular, the MST has worked with the settlers on valuing settlement collective work
and reinforcing settlement leadership authority. Thus, these entities serve what Ostrom
has referred to in her principle eight as ‘nested enterprises’ in that the institutions of the
settlement are nested within those of the local, regional, and state government. In Figure
1 this is indicated by the circle surrounding the settlement. Furthermore, the ability to
appeal directly to entities of the government, for example, INCRA and IDACE, shows that
the self-management rules of the community are recognized by the government, Ostrom’s
principle number seven.

6.2

The Institutions of SJA

The subprojects studied had the goal of either the production of a local-level public good,
a common pool resource, or a shared private good. Infrastructure subprojects included
perimeter fences and reservoirs for settlements. Both perimeter fences and reservoirs are
non-excludable. The fence is non-rival, while the reservoir is rival (due to limited quantity
and quality of water). Thus, the perimeter fence has the characteristics of a local-level
public good, and the reservoir has the characteristics of a common pool resource. Productive
subprojects included irrigation, bee-keeping, tractors, and crops. These goods are both rival
and excludable; as such they have the characteristics of a private good. Subproject rules
allow for subproject members to freely exit subprojects, but they are not allowed to rejoin.
Subproject rules also allow the group to exclude members from a subproject if they fail to
participate.
It would seem likely that within the SJA subprojects, free riding would present a more
significant potential problem for the infrastructure subprojects than for the productive
subprojects because of the type of good created. Yet, the ability to exclude free riders
from productive subproject gains also proved difficult. Exclusion depends on the design
and implementation of subproject rules, which were often vague. In fact, I found little
19

Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária, the national agency in charge of land reform
Instituto do Desenvolvimento Agrário do Ceará, the state agency in charge of the Crédito Fundı́ario,
the market-based land reform program.
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Figure 1: Flowchart 1: Settlement Collective Work Institutions
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Step 3: Threat

MST, Union
INCRA, CF

evidence that subproject participants had excluded members from productive subproject
outcomes, even in the presence of free riding. Unfortunately, the long time to maturity of
productive subprojects and their high failure rate meant I had little data by which to assess
the ability of the settlers to exclude free riders from productive subprojects. It seems likely
that, in the event these subprojects were to succeed in increasing production and income
for members, they would become more desirable to members, increasing their participation.
The persistent problems the settlement collective work faces predicts successful, productive
subprojects, with their need for ongoing collective work and vague rules, might also face
free riding problems in the future, particularly in the case of communities that do not have
strong institutions of collective action.
Table 5 provides a breakdown of the types of free riding and when they can potentially
occur. Boxed numbers indicate that this type of free riding affected my case studies. The
Implementation Stage of both the infrastructure and the productive subprojects had very
few problems with free riding. During this stage, there are two factors which prevent free
riding. First, technical agencies assist the settlers in constructing the subprojects. Often
the settlers work alongside the technical agencies, which serve as an outside monitor of
non-participation during the implementation period, serving as a complement to internal
institutional structures that limit free riding. For example, Settlement 4 constructed a
shed with the assistance of two hired masons. Community members were required to
assist the masons, rotating the jobs among the families each day. Second, the settlers are
generally enthusiastic about the subproject prospects resulting in high levels of motivation
and participation.
In the case of infrastructure subprojects, once the Implementation Stage is complete, the
technical agency leaves the settlement and the project transitions into an Operations and
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Table 5: Types of Free Riding
Stage 2
Implementation
1,2,3
1,2,3

Stage 3
O&M
1, 2 ,3
1, 2 ,3,4

Stage 4
None

Public Goods
CPR

Stage 1
Approval
1
1

Private Goods

Approval
1

Implementation
1,2,3

Incubation
1,2,3

Output
—, —, —

Infrastructure

Productive

Author’s typology. 1,2,3,4 indicate different types of free riding that could occur in the projects included
in my case studies.
1 = Failure to participate in organizational activities
2 = Failure to provide monetary contributions
3 = Shirking subproject work
4 = Overuse of resource
A box around the numbers indicates I observed this type of free riding in my case studies.
— Indicates that none of the productive projects in my study had reached the Output Stage and as such
I could not observe or interview settlers about free riding. I would assume that free riding could occur
here as either 1, 2 or 3.

Maintenance Stage (O&M). In this stage, much of the collective work in the infrastructure
subprojects is completed during the time set aside for settlement collective work. Thus, if
shirking is present in the settlement collective work, it will also affect the SJA subproject
work. The infrastructure subprojects in my case studies occurred in Settlements 2, 4, and
6. Settlements 2 and 4 had few problems with collective settlement work. Settlement 6’s
subproject failed but not for reasons of free riding.
Unlike the settlement collective work, many of the rules of the subprojects were established by the SDA and the WB, and not by the participants themselves. This is different
from Ostrom’s principle three. For example, in the infrastructure subprojects during the
O&M stage the settlement is expected (by the WB and SDA) to charge a fee to each member for the use of the good. Settlements 2 and 4 were unable to charge a fee to its members
for the use of the fence (Settlement 6’s subproject, a reservoir, was never built). Since the
good is non-excludable, it becomes difficult to enforce a fee for use. The leadership did
not seem concerned that members were not paying the fees and had made no attempts
to resolve the (supposed) problem. This required rule did not seem to reflect community
values.
Stage 3 is the Incubation Stage for the productive subprojects, and this is where free
riding occurred for Settlement 5, and where possible indications of free riding occurred
for Settlements 3 and 7. Settlement 5 tried to institute rules dealing with free riding in
their apiculture project by creating a document outlining the rules of the subproject. For
example, the document states if a person misses more than two days in a row without a
reasonable excuse it will be brought to the attention of the group (Assentamento 5, Associacao do Projecto de Assentamento 5, 2008). If they continue missing work, then it will be
brought up in an administrative meeting, and the person can be excluded from the subproject (Assentamento 5, Associacao do Projecto de Assentamento 5, 2008). There were two
problems with this rule. One, it does not delineate practical guidelines, such as the number
of missed days leading to an administrative meeting or exclusion from the subproject. Second, although a document outlining the rules existed, none of the interviewees mentioned
it except the president.
Unfortunately, the drought that had persisted in the region for the two years preceding
17

the period of my investigation had weakened Settlement 5’s subproject. The drought had
contributed to a lack of flowers and subproject participants were feeding the bees in order
to keep them alive. Of the eleven households who considered themselves current members of the project, only four households were contributing money to buy the sugar and
contributing labor to feed the bees. Those who were not contributing were not expelled
from the subproject. Invariably, they said they were waiting for good rains and the bees to
begin producing honey to start working on the subproject again. In this case, even though
they had a list of rules for the subproject, the settlement members were not using them to
exclude free riding members from the subproject.
Settlements 3 and 7 both had irrigation subprojects. One of the main challenges to
these two subprojects was the need to provide monthly electricity payments. The settlers
were not willing to pay these charges. In both cases, the settlements were eligible for
government-subsidized electricity. Neither settlement was willing to go through the government bureaucracy to access these funds indicating a failure of the subproject members to
take on the necessary (re)organizational chores. In Settlement 3, the group as a whole decided to leave the project. The fact that members were unwilling to either pay for electricity
or to undertake the bureaucratic process of accessing subsidized electricity might indicate
some free riding. In Settlement 7, there was persistent attrition from the subproject until
the costs of electricity were too much for the remaining project members and they quit as
well. Subproject attrition could also indicate free riding problems.
I did not observe free riding in Stage 4, the Output Stage, in which the productive subproject is successfully harvesting and marketing the output because none of the productive
SJA subprojects had reached that phase successfully (despite being established in 2007-2010
and my not visiting till 2012-2013). This is explored in greater detail in Carrick-Hagenbarth
(Carrick-Hagenbarth, 2016).
Ostrom also notes the importance of monitoring and graduated sanctions (Ostrom,
1990). Monitoring was done on an ad hoc basis by those involved in subprojects, but
specific monitors were not designated. Finally, there were not graduated sanctions for
rule transgressions in the productive SJA subprojects. In groups with institutions that
do not have graduated sanctions, a person falls into only one of two classifications: a
participant or a non-participant. The production is then divided among the participants
regardless of total effort contributed to the production. Yet, participants may shirk or
even fail to show up for collective work in varying amounts, free riding on the labor of
others. In the absence of graduated sanctions, it may seem overly harsh to exclude a
participant for small transgressions. In addition, it might be politically and socially costly to
exclude free riding participants from the subproject. Lastly, the method by which to exclude
participating members may not have been defined prior to the subproject adequately to
enable the community to enforce such exclusion. Generally, if people violated rules or
free rode extensively, they could be asked to leave the subproject. I did not find that the
settlers had imposed this sanction. Additionally there no other mechanisms to resolve SJA
subproject conflicts. Lastly, the SJA subprojects did not provide an institutionalized way
to solve subproject problems.
In the Figures 1 and 2, it is clear that the institutions of the settlement collective work
are much more robust than those of SJA subprojects. Shirking in productive subprojects
in my sample tended to increase over time. Thus, subprojects with ongoing labor —
productive subprojects — tend to face more shirking than those based primarily around
18

Figure 2: Flowchart 2: São José Agrário Subproject Institutions
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an implementation stage — infrastructure subprojects. Free riding may become a more
severe problem for successful, productive collective subprojects than for successful collective
infrastructure subprojects (not what would be expected based on the kind of good created).
Collective work on the settlements and in the SJA subprojects can be difficult to sustain
and accompaniment by groups, such as the MST and the Agricultural Workers Union, have
served an important role in maintaining effectiveness. As we saw in a previous section,
Settlement 5 asked the MST for help when they were facing free riding in collective work.
Through community meetings, the MST worked with settlers on valuing of settlement
collective work. Their presence also served the purpose of reinforcing the leadership’s
authority. Settlements 1 and 2, which were strongly linked to the MST, had community
members who worked directly with the MST, served as militants for the MST, or were
studying in one of the educational programs of the MST. These settlements appeared to
have a stronger commitment to the values of collective work. Interviews in these settlements
revealed no problems with collective work in either settlement maintenance or in the SJA
subprojects. Due to the institutions of the settlements and the accompaniment of the MST
most problems with free riding in collective settlement work and in the subprojects were
overcome.

7

Conclusion

São José Agrário’s partnership with the Landless Workers’ Movements (MST) combined
a project-based approach to participatory development with a radical approach creating
a better institutional environment for the implementation of a community-driven development project. My case studies showed how the settlers overcame political pressure and
avoided clientelistic relationships. Although I found significant differences in income and
education of participants, I found no evidence of elite capture of project funds or subproject
benefits in the case studies. Free riding presented challenges to settlement collective work
and, to a lesser extent to the SJA subprojects, but these challenges were mostly surmounted.
The settlers were able to overcome problems of clientelism, elite capture, and free riding
due to the robust institutions created in the agrarian settlements and the accompaniment
of the MST.
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project choice: Theory and evidence from ecuador. Journal of Public Economics 92 (5),
1022–1046.
Arcand, J.-L. and N. Wagner (2016). Does community-driven development improve inclusiveness in peasant organizations?–evidence from senegal. World Development 78,
105–124.
Assentamento 5, Associacao do Projecto de Assentamento 5 (2008). Regimento interno do
projeto de apicultura.
Banerjee, A. and E. Duflo (2011). Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to
Fight Global Poverty. PublicAffairs.
Brett, E. A. (2003). Participation and accountability in development management. The
Journal of Development Studies 40 (2), 1–29.
Camacho, A. and E. Conover (2011). Manipulation of social program eligibility. American
Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 41–65.
Carrick-Hagenbarth, J. (2016). Elite Capture, Free Riding, and Project Design: A Case
Study of a Community-Driven Development Project in Ceara, Brazil. Ph. D. thesis.
Doctoral Dissertations. 831.
Centro de Politicas Sociais (2011). Qual a faixa de renda familiar das classes?
Chambers, R. (1983). Rural Development: Putting the Last First. Wiley.
Chebil, S. and I. Haque (2003). Community driven development programs for poverty
reduction: Experiences, issues, and lessons. Development 1 (1).
Coirolo, L. and J. Lammert (2009). Rural poverty reduction in Northeast Brazil: Achieving
results through community driven development. Technical report, World Bank.
Cooke, B. (2001). The social psychological limits of participation? In Participation: the
new tyranny?, pp. 102–121. Zed Books.
Craig, G. and M. Mayo (1995). Community Empowerment: A Reader in Participation
and Development (Experiences of Grassroots Development), Chapter Community Participation and Empowerment: The Human Face of Structural Adjustment or Tools for
Democratic Transformation?, pp. 1–11. Zed Books.
Das Gupta, M., H. Grandvoinnet, and M. Romani (2004). State-community synergies in
community-driven development. Journal of Development Studies 40, 27–58.

20

Dasgupta, A. and V. A. Beard (2007). Community driven development, collective action
and elite capture in Indonesia. Development and Change 38 (2), 229–249.
Deaton, A. (1997). The analysis of household surveys: a microeconometric approach to
development policy. World Bank Publications.
FETRAECE Representative B (2013). Interview. Interview by Author, May 13th.
Finan, F. (2004). Political patronage and local development: A Brazilian case study. Working Paper, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California
Berkeley.
Freire, P. (1970). Pedagogy of the Oppressed (30th Anniversary Edition ed.). Continuum.
Fritzen, S. A. (2007). Can the design of community-driven development reduce the risk of
elite capture? evidence from indonesia. World Development 35 (8), 1359–1375.
Funder, M. (2010). The social shaping of participatory spaces: Evidence from community
development in southern thailand. The Journal of Development Studies 46 (10), 1708–
1728.
Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science 162 (3859), 1243–1248.
Henkel, H. and R. Stirrat (2001). Participation as spiritual duty; empowerment: as secular
subjection. In Participation: The New Tyranny? Zed Books.
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estastistica (2011). Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de
Domicı́lios.
Landless Workers Movement Representative A (2013). Interview. Landless Workers Movement Office (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra), Interview by Author, May 20th.
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A

Assets

As Angus Deaton points out in his book The Analysis of Household Surveys: a Mircoeconometric Approach to Development Policy there are a number of obstacles to accurate income
data collection via survey (Deaton, 1997, 29). Income data is often subject to recall bias
and seasonality. In the case of rural households, income data becomes harder to collect
and quantify as rural households often supplement their consumption through subsistence
production and collection via nearby forests and bodies of water. Additionally, people are
more hesitant to reveal income data as compared with consumption data. Furthermore,
survey data understates inequality as wealthier households are less willing to reveal their income as compared with lower-income households. On the other hand, surveys that measure
income via consumption will tend to under report wealthier households’ income, as such
households generally save a greater portion of their incomes, which may not be recorded in
such surveys (Deaton, 1997).
For these reasons, I also collected data on assets. In particular, I concentrated on
durable household goods as a check on my income data. Table 6 presents a breakdown
of the number and percent of households from my survey that have a particular good.
Some households have more than one of a good, for example, cell phones, fans, televisions,
bicycles, and motorcycles. I list the number of families that have more than one of a
good in the table notes. Those assets that are of greater value and only held by a subset
of the families indicate income inequality; cars, sewing machines, and washing machines.
The main form of transportation were by motorcycle and bicycle. Around forty percent of
my sample had a motorcycle. Together these make up some of the most expensive goods
(excluding bicycles). It might seem that a freezer should also be included here, but many
households who have a freezer do not have a refrigerator and vice versa. Thus the freezer
and refrigerator function as substitutes. The existence of some goods that only between six
and thirty percent of households own indicates some asset inequality. In addition, there are
some families that had more than one motorcycle (seven households have two motorcycles,
and one household had three), also reinforcing my finding of some asset inequality.
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Table 6: Durable Household Assets
Household Assets
Cell Phone*
Stove
Refrigerator
Freezer
Blender
Fan*
Washing Machine
Sewing Machine
Satellite
Television*
DVD Player
Radio
Stereo
Bicycle*
Motorcycle*
Car
Truck

Frequency
62
82
86
13
79
59
15
25
66
86
66
81
47
72
56
6
0

Percent
67
88
92
14
85
63
16
27
71
92
71
87
51
77
40
6
0

Author’s Data. * Indicates that some households had more than one.
Cell phones: 36 households had 1, 16 households had 2, 9 households
had 3, 1 household had 5. Fan: 57 households had 1, 2 households
had 2. Television: 84 households had 1, 2 households had 2. Bicycle:
48 households had 1, 15 households had 2, 5 households had 3, 4
households had 4. Motorcycle: 48 households had 1, 7 households
had 2, 1 household had 3. I also asked about landlines and VHS
players, but since no one had these, I eliminate them from the table.

B

Per Capita Ginis

Here I have calculate the overall per capita Gini and the per capita Gini for each settlement.
The per capita Gini for each settlement varies between 0.33 and 0.47.
Table 7: Per Capita Income Inequality by Settlement
Settlement
All
3
4
5
6
7
8

Min
92
92
881
680
559
668
1010

Max
16077
3683
15476
3770
15750
10515
16077

Median
1741
630
2109
1610
1647
3103
2770

Gini
.47
.47
.42
.33
.47
.39
.41

Author’s Data. Reais per year per capita. Over 2013, the exchange
rate was roughly two Reais to one US Dollar.

C

Household Gini Decomposition

The Gini decomposition following the Lopez-Feldman method has several components
(López-Feldman et al., 2006). Sk is the share of the source income as a proportion of
the Gini, Gk is how unequal the source income is, Rk is the relationship between the source
income and the Gini, Share is the share of the Gini coefficient the source income makes up,
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%Change shows how a one percent increase in the source income would affect the overall
Gini.
I find according to this decomposition that all source income apart from retirement/pensions
and livestock income decrease inequality. Livestock income has only a small effect: a 1%
increase in income deriving from livestock sale increases the Gini by .01%. Since Settlement 8 has the highest amount of income coming from livestock, I exclude this settlement
(going from 93 observations to 76) to evaluate if livestock income would still be a source of
increasing inequality. I then calculate the new Gini and new Gini decomposition. Excluding settlement 8, the household Ginis are almost the same going from 0.415 in Table 8 to
0.418 Table 9. It also suggests that Settlement 8 is driving the result that livestock income
contributes to increasing inequality as once we exclude Settlement 8, Livestock Income has
a small negative effect on the overall Gini. The retirement/pension income continues to
positively affect the Gini in both decompositions.
Table 8: Household Gini Decomposition by Income Source
Source
income from outside work
retirement/pensions
welfare (Bolsa Famı́lia)
other transfers
crop income
livestock income
Total income

Sk
0.2167
0.3374
0.1311
0.1057
0.0066
0.2026
0.4150

Gk
0.7838
0.7349
0.4457
0.4365
0.9448
0.6919

Rk
0.5149
0.9171
-0.1449
0.4035
0.0758
0.6389

Share
0.2107
0.5479
-0.0204
0.0448
0.0011
0.2158

% Change
-0.0060
0.2105
-0.1515
-0.0608
-0.0054
0.0132

Author’s Data. Using Lopez-Feldman’s Descogini command in Stata. Observations
equals 93.

Table 9: Household Gini Decomposition by Income Source Excluding Settlement 8
Source
income from outside work
retirement/pensions
welfare (Bolsa Famı́lia)
other transfers
crop income
livestock income
Total income

Sk
0.2280
0.3510
0.1544
0.1058
0.0091
0.1517

Gk
0.8100
0.7517
0.4424
0.3713
0.9324
0.6845
0.4183

Rk
0.5100
0.9096
-0.0476
0.5906
0.1703
0.6042

Share
0.2251
0.5737
-0.0078
0.0555
0.0035
0.1500

% Change
-0.0029
0.2227
-0.1621
-0.0504
-0.0057
-0.0017

Author’s Data. Using Lopez-Feldman’s Descogini command in Stata. Observation
equal 76.

D

Level of Education by Age 18 Years and Older

In Table 10 it is clear that the older generations were significantly less educated than the
younger generations, in fact, many are illiterate. The youngest generations have much more
education, including some post-secondary schooling.
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Table 10: Education Differences by Generation: Years of Education
Age
18-27
28-37
38-47
48-57
58-67
68-77
78-87
Total

0 years
0
2
6
11
11
9
5
44

1-4 years
10
26
33
18
12
7
0
106

5-8 years
18
11
17
2
1
1
0
50

9-11 years
42
5
2
1
0
0
0
50

Post-Secondary
6
2
0
0
1
0
0
9

Total
76
46
58
32
25
17
5
259

Author’s Data. Number of people in each age group with the given level of education, for those 18
and older.

E

Age as a Predictor of the Level of Education Extended

Belonging to a particular household may affect the result that age is highly correlated
with the level of education achieved. In particular, the educational levels of the head of
household may be positively correlated with the educational outcomes of children, as parents
with greater levels of education may place a higher value on the education of their children.
I have included the results from model 1 for comparison. In the second model, column two,
I control for the head of household’s educational level. I drop all people that are ten years
younger than the head of household or older. This way I exclude the majority of extended
family members such as aunts, uncles, or grandparents. I also drop all individuals younger
than eighteen. I am left with a significantly reduced and younger sample size of 90.
My regression is the following

EDi = β1 + β2 Ai + β3 Hi + θ1 Fi + δ4 S4i + δ5 S5i + δ6 S6i + δ7 S7i + δ8 S8i + µi

(1)

where ED is education, H is the education level of the head of household, A is age, F
is a dummy variable for female, and S is a dummy variable for Settlements 4 through 8,
with Settlement 3 as a baseline, i indexes individuals.
Overall, I find the education level of the head of household has a positive but not
significant effect on the educational levels of younger household members. The age of
the individual continues to be strongly significant in predicting educational outcomes, one
additional year of age is correlated with almost .2 years less of education.
The coefficient for being female has changed signs. For women in this sample, gender has
a negative but not statistically significant effect on education. There could be a qualitative
difference between the education of older generations and that of younger generations.
For older generations going to school and working in the fields were competing activities,
in which male children spent more time working in the fields, and female children may
have found it feasible to attend school for longer. Currently, education has expanded, and
conditional cash transfers require children to attend school. As such, gender may not have
a large effect on educational outcomes.
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Table 11: OLS Regression Results Dependent Variable Education
Variables
Age

Education (1)

Education (2)

-0.154***
(0.011)

0.938***
(0.351)
0.806
(0.677)
0.506
(0.592)
1.670**
(0.714)
-0.399
(0.567)
2.083***
(0.587)
10.03***
(0.579)

-0.199***
(0.030)
0.115
(0.138)
-0.020
(0.606)
0.009
(1.098)
1.952*
(0.996)
1.758
(1.150)
-1.185
(0.924)
2.601***
(0.801)
11.907***
(0.912)

259
0.526

90
0.539

HOH Education
Female
Settlement 4
Settlement 5
Settlement 6
Settlement 7
Settlement 8
Constant

Observations
R-squared

Model 1 is an OLS regression estimating the effect of age on educational
achievements of adults (age>17) with dummy variables for gender and settlement on which the person lives. Model 2 presents an OLS regression estimating the same as Model 1 but also controlling for the impact of the education of
the head of household on educational achievements of individuals. Standard
errors in parentheses, *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant
at 10%.

F

Agricultural Background

Table 12 shows the agricultural backgrounds of the settlers. Almost all worked in some
type of agricultural work prior to joining the settlements.
Table 12: Types of Work
Type of Work
Temporary Rural Wage Worker
Permanent Rural Worker
Small Rural Producer (less than 50 ha)
Worked as a relative of a Small Rural Producer
Sharecroppers
Other
NA
Total

Number
20
18
1
5
43
4
2
93

Percent
22
19
1
5
46
4
2
100

Author’s Data. NA signifies not applicable, these were young people whose
first jobs were being settlers.
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G

Participation in SJA Subprojects

Table 13 provides information on the number of participating households compared with
total eligible households either at the time of my visit (2012-2013) or at the time when the
subproject ended if it had ended prior to my visit.
Table 13: Participation in SJA Subprojects
Settlement
Settlement
Settlement
Settlement
Settlement
Settlement
Settlement
Total

3
4
5
6
7
8

Number Participating/Total Households
10/12
10/10
11/19
7/10
11/25
17/17
66/93

Author’s Data.
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